University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2008

Coverage Advice: The Missing Piece of the Cumis
Puzzle
Leo P. Martinez
UC Hastings College of the Law, martinezleo@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Leo P. Martinez, Coverage Advice: The Missing Piece of the Cumis Puzzle, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J 63 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1440

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

COVERAGE ADVICE: THE MISSING
PIECE OF THE CUMIS PUZZLE

Leo P Martinez

I.
II.
III.
IV

Introduction ..................................................................................
Background ....................................................................................
T he Problem .................................................................................
Imprecision of Conflicts of Interest ..............................................
A. Insurer's Reservation of Rights ................................................
B. Problem of Confidential Information .....................................
V C onclusion .....................................................................................

63
64
67
73
76
77
78

I. INTRODUCTION

As observed recently by Professor James Fisher, the role of independent
counsel has not received the attention it deserves. 1 The subject of "Cumis
counsel," a concept that took its name from San Diego Navy FederalCredit
Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.,2 has received less and less attention
as the years have passed.' In the last ten years, the scholarly commentary
on Cumis, including related topics ranging from the tripartite relationship
1. James Fischer, The ProfessionalObligationsof Counsel Retainedfor the Policyholderbut Not
ToRT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 173 (Winter 2008).
2. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
3. Fischer, supra note 1, at 173-74.

Subject to Insurer Control, 43

Leo P Martinez is Professorof Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. I am gratefulfor the insightsprovided by Doug Richmond, Senior Vice PresidentAon
Risk Services in Chicago;John Worden of SchiffHardin in San Francisco;David Goodwin
of HellerEhrman White & McAuliffe in San Francisco;and MargieLariviere,Executive,
Claims Operations Services, California State Automobile Association in San Francisco.
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to independent counsel to the role of retained counsel subject to insurer
control, has reduced to a trickle after an initial torrent of comment.4 Court
dicta has shadowed this development. Indeed, in the past five years, there is
scarcely a judicial mention of Cumis beyond the obligatory reference to the
tripartite relationship. Cumis has been relegated to the banal. Like James
Fischer, however, I believe that lawyers who ignore Cumis risk a closer
relationship with their malpractice insurers.
In this piece, I return to the basics. I focus not so much on the tripartite relationship among the insurer, the insured, and defense counsel that received
attention initially. Rather, this discussion is devoted to the role of coverage
counsel in cases involving conflicts of interest in the tripartite relationship.
II. BACKGROUND

Cumis spawned such expressions as "Cumis counsel," "Cumis provision," and
the like.6 Like many eponymous cases, including Mary Carter,7 Miranda,'
and Dred Scott,9 the familiarity of use breeds contempt; and we soon divorce
the facts of the resulting case, substituting instead the easy and uncritical
casualness of shorthand. Hence, it is useful to reread the Cumis case and
recollect, or at least refresh, in our minds exactly what Cumis stands for.
4. A number of excellent treatments on the ethical and malpractice considerations of insurance law practice are available. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
§ 7.6(c) (West 1988); RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 23 (3d
ed. 1989); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons,4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997-1998); John W Dondanville, Defense Counsel Beware:
The Perilsof Conflicts of Interest, 18 FORUM 62 (Fall 1982); Robert E. Keeton, Taking Professional
Risks, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 405 (1997-1998); Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principlesfor the Insurer,
the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REv. 511 (Dec.
1991); Frank Revere & Arthur J. Chapman, Insurer'sDuty to Defend, 13 PAC. L.J. 889 (1982);
Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the EternalTriangle ofInsurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 475 (1996); Donald E. Sharpe & Jean K. Shaffer, The Parametersofan Insurer's Duty
to Defend, 19 FORUM 555 (1984); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The ProfessionalResponsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (Nov. 1995); J. Snowden Stanley Jr., Can
We Defend Both? A Defense Counsel's Dilemma, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 59 (Fall 1986); William C.
Carpenter, Note, Reservation of Rights in Insurance Contracts,32 ARiz. L. REv. 387 (1990).
5. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358.
6. The case also prompted me to look up the dictionary meaning of the word eponymous
when I was new to law practice a number of years ago. I discovered that an eponym is "one

for whom or which something is or is believed to be named."

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE

DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eponym.
7. The term "Mary Carter agreement" is based on a 1967 Florida case, Booth v. Mary
CarterPaintCo., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruledin partby Wardv. Ochoa, 284
So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973), which upheld the validity and nondisclosure to nonsettling parties
of a secret agreement that limited the maximum liability of two out of three defendants. The
term "Mary Carter agreement" was actually coined in Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, 264
So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), modified, 284 So. 2d 389, 390-91 (Fla. 1973).
8. Miranda v. Ariz., 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
9. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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The various ways that Cumis has been examined are reminiscent of the
fabled blind men who encounter an elephant. Each perceives the elephant
differently. None is wrong in his assessment, but each misses the sense of
the whole. I0 Broadly, Cumis holds that whenever an insurer denies coverage,
proceeds under a reservation of rights, or is faced with a conflict of interest
(when the insured is sued for damages above the liability coverage), the insured has the right to independent counsel for which the insurer must pay. 1
The underlying case in Cumis involved a wrongful termination action
brought by Magdaline S. Eisenmann against the San Diego Navy Federal
Credit Union (Credit Union). 2 The Eisenmann action alleged a number
of intentional torts in addition to negligence. 13 The Credit Union tendered
the defense to its insurer, Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (Cumis), which
retained the San Diego law firm of Goebel & Monaghan to represent the
Credit Union.14 Cumis also informed Goebel & Monaghan that Cumis
was reserving its right to deny coverage at a later date and that the insurance policies did not cover punitive damages." Goebel & Monaghan
apparently did not at any time provide advice regarding coverage to the
Credit Union. 6 Soon thereafter, Cumis informed the Credit Union that
it was reserving its rights to disclaim coverage and that punitive damages
would not be covered under the policy. 7
After receiving the reservation of rights letter, the Credit Union retained the San Diego law firm of Saxon, Alt & Brewer to provide independent representation." Although Cumis initially paid the invoices submitted,
it soon stopped paying for the Saxon firm's costs on the basis that both Cumis
and Goebel & Monaghan had arrived at the astounding conclusion that no
conflict of interest existed. 19 This was followed by a settlement conference
attended by Goebel & Monaghan, at which Eisenmann offered to settle
the case within the policy limits.20 Yet the parties did not reach a settlement

10. This is not to suggest that my own view is any less blind to the whole than others who
have written on the topic.
11. The only significant case in California questioning Cumis is in a foomote of Dynamic
Concepts, Inc. v. Truck InsuranceFxchange, 61 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1002 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), in
which the court stated that California Civil Code § 2860, the text of which appears infra note
31, overruled dicta in Cumis, indicating that insurer-appointed defense would only offer token
advocacy to claims outside the policy limits or serve to protect only the insurer's interests.
12. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 361-62.
15. Id. at 362.
16. Id.
17. Id. The relevant text of the letter reserving rights is contained in the opinion. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 363.
20. Id.
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because Cumis only authorized Goebel & Monaghan to make an offer in
an amount lower than the demand.21 Although Goebel & Monaghan were
in contact with Cumis before and during the settlement conference, the
22
Credit Union was never contacted until after the conference ended.
Thereafter, the Credit Union filed an action to require Cumis to pay all
reasonable past and future expenses of Saxon, Alt & Brewer in the defense
of the Eisenmann lawsuit.23 In the litigation between Cumis and the Credit
Union, the trial court held that Cumis was required to pay for the Saxon
firm's fees as independent counsel.24 In affirming the trial court's decision, the
California Court of Appeal recognized that the interests of the insurer and
the policyholder diverge where some of the allegations of a complaint do not
fall within the scope of an insurance policy's coverage; in the court's words,
2
"[i]n this situation, there may be little commonality of interest." The court
also recognized that although questions of coverage are not litigated in the
underlying suit, counsel for the insured (here, Goebel & Monaghan) neces26
sarily make decisions that will benefit either the insurer or the policyholder.
It did not help Cumis's position that Goebel & Monaghan communicated
with it and not the insured in the course of the settlement conference.
The court noted that it was the insured who was entitled to select independent counsel and to have the "reasonable value of the professional
services" paid by the insurer.27
Ultimately, the court adopted a broad prophylactic rule:
We conclude the Canons of Ethics impose upon lawyers hired by the insurer
an obligation to explain to the insured and the insurer the full implications of
joint representation in situations where the insurer has reserved its rights to
deny coverage. If the insured does not give an informed consent to continued representation, counsel must cease to represent both. Moreover, in the
absence of such consent, where there are divergent interests of the insured
and the insurer brought about by the insurer's reservation of rights based on
possible noncoverage under the insurance policy, the insurer must pay the
reasonable cost for hiring independent counsel by the insured. The insurer
may not compel the insured to surrender control of the litigation [citations
omitted]. Disregarding the common interests of both insured and insurer in
finding total nonliability in the third party action, the remaining interests
of the two diverge to such an extent as to create an actual, ethical conflict of
interest warranting payment for the insureds' independent counsel.2"
21. Id.
22. Id. at 365.
23. Id. at 361.
24. Id. at 363.
25. ld. at 364.
26. Id. at 365. Inaddition, the court observed that this dilemma was also necessarily part of
pretrial discovery. As such, confidentiality was an issue as well. Id. at 366.
27. Id. at 371.
28. Id. at 375.
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III. THE PROBLEM
Cumis made clear that an insurer's reservation of rights was a conflict that
lawyers hired by that insurer had to address in a direct way. The lawyer
was bound to advise the insured as to the conflict and if the insured did
not consent to continued representation, the insurer was bound to retain
independent counsel for the insured.29 At the same time, Cumis raised more
questions than it answered, among them whether or not the insurer in
effect lost control of the defense in the underlying tort case. It did not address the proper standard of conduct for Cumis counsel, nor did it address
the counselors' qualifications. 0 Further, the case did not address what fee
or rate the Cumis lawyer was to be paid. Importantly, Cumis did not discuss the process or the mechanism by which an insured would be advised
regarding whether a conflict triggering the appointment of independent
counsel was present or not.
The California legislature responded to some of these concerns by enacting Civil Code § 2860.31' Among other things, § 2860 purported to set

29. Id.
30. To be fair, the court noted that it was the insured who was entitled to select independent counsel and to have the "reasonable value of the professional services" paid by the
insurer. Id. at 371.
31. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2860 (2008) is set forth below:
§ 2860. Conflict of interest; duty to provide independent counsel; waiver; qualifications of independent counsel; fees; disclosure of information:
(a)If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and
a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent
the insured unless, at the time the insured is informed that a possible conflict may arise or
does exist, the insured expressly waives, in writing, the right to independent counsel. An
insurance contract may contain a provision which sets forth the method of selecting that
counsel consistent with this section.
(b) For purposes of this section, a conflict of interest does not exist as to allegations or
facts in the litigation for which the insurer denies coverage; however, when an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled
by counsel first retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a conflict of interest
may exist. No conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist as to allegations of punitive damages or be deemed to exist solely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of the
insurance policy limits.
(c)When the insured has selected independent counsel to represent him or her, the insurer
may exercise its right to require that the counsel selected by the insured possess certain minimum qualifications which may include that the selected counsel have (1) at least five years of
civil litigation practice which includes substantial defense experience in the subject at issue
in the litigation, and (2) errors and omissions coverage. The insurer's obligation to pay fees
to the independent counsel selected by the insured is limited to the rates which are actually
paid by the insurer to attorneys retained by it in the ordinary course of business in the defense of similar actions in the community where the claim arose or is being defended. This
subdivision does not invalidate other different or additional policy provisions pertaining to
attorney's fees or providing for methods of settlement of disputes concerning those fees. Any
dispute concerning attorney's fees not resolved by these methods shall be resolved by final
and binding arbitration by a single neutral arbitrator selected by the parties to the dispute.
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fees for appointed counsel by using the rates in the community where the
dispute is adjudicated.12 One of the most significant departures from Cumis
in the statute is the statement that a conflict does not arise upon the mere
denial of coverage but may arise where the insurer reserves rights and
where the coverage issue is under the control of the counsel first retained
to defend the claim." Effectively, the statute reset the default position articulated in Cumis. However, like Cumis itself, the civil code section is silent
as to how the existence of conflict is to be determined and who is to advise
the insured in the process.
For the most part, the scholarship dealing with this problem has focused
on the difficulty of balancing the duties and relationships of insurance defense counsel. 34 By itself, this balancing is not a trivial task. As discussed
below, some scholars, like Doug Richmond, have addressed the matter in
conventional terms.3" By contrast, Professor Tom Baker has resorted to ge36
ometry to assist in understanding this complex set of relationships. What

(d) When independent counsel has been selected by the insured, it shall be the duty of
that counsel and the insured to disclose to the insurer all information concerning the action
except privileged materials relevant to coverage disputes, and timely to inform and consult
with the insurer on all matters relating to the action. Any claim of privilege asserted is
subject to in camera review in the appropriate law and motion department of the superior
court. Any information disclosed by the insured or by independent counsel is not a waiver
of the privilege as to any other party.
(e) The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel by signing the following statement: "I have been advised and informed of my right to select independent counsel
to represent me in this lawsuit. I have considered this matter fully and freely waive my
right to select independent counsel at this time. I authorize my insurer to select a defense
attorney to represent me in this lawsuit."
(f) Where the insured selects independent counsel pursuant to the provisions of this
section, both the counsel provided by the insurer and independent counsel selected by the
insured shall be allowed to participate in all aspects of the litigation. Counsel shall cooperate fully in the exchange of information that is consistent with each counsel's ethical and
legal obligation to the insured. Nothing in this section shall relieve the insured of his or her
duty to cooperate with the insurer under the terms of the insurance contract.
32. The California Supreme Court has suggested that the limitations do not apply if the
insurer has refused to provide a defense. In such cases, the fees paid by an insured for defense
are presumptively reasonable. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d
118 (Cal. 1997).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(b) (2008). It is not clear whether this part of the statute should
be read conjunctively or disjunctively. Stated another way, the statute does not clarify whether
the questions of reservation of rights and counsel's control state two separate and independent
elements or whether both may be required to establish a conflict of interest.
34. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4; Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lanyers' Professional Responsibilities: Part II-Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL Emics 29 (2001);

Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tigbtrope: The TripartiteRelationship Between Insurer, Insured,
and Insurance Defense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REv. 265 (1994).
35. Richmond, supra note 34passim.
36. Baker, supra note 4passim.
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this piece serves to highlight is what has been forgotten in the fray, i.e., the
role of coverage advice.
Traditionally, the problem addressed by Cumis has been described as the
"tripartite relationship" among the insurer, the insured, and defense counsel.37 The suggestion made by Cumis that the tripartite relationship posed
a conflict of interest when an insurer reserved its rights was at the time a
startling development.38 Not surprisingly, this was the aspect of the Cumis
case that garnered the most ink.
In order to examine the problems that arise out of this conflict, the relationships among the parties must be sharply defined. Fortunately, the basic
relationships are simple. The obligations of parties to the typical liability
insurance policy are defined by contract law. Parties that purchase liability
insurance that they hope will protect them against liability to third parties
want two things: (a) the insurer's promise to pay (within the policy limits)
any amount adjudged against the insured and (b) the insurer's promise to
defend the insured in an action to have such liability adjudged. Insurers are,
of course, willing to sell such promises. The terms in which such promises
are clothed are less than simple after decades of judicial interpretation.
An insured is generally entitled to compensation for covered losses during the policy period. Coverage under an insurance policy is determined
by focusing on the terms of the policy itself, taking into account the scope
and the limitations of the insurer's undertaking.39 As one court has noted:
"To establish coverage under an insurance policy, the insured must show
that the occurrence on which the claim is based falls within the scope of
basic coverage. " 40
To illustrate, a fairly ordinary set of clauses (slightly adapted from those
currently in use) bearing on the insurer's obligation to pay and to defend in
an automobile liability policy would read thus:
(a) Insurer will pay on behalf of the insured all damages which the insured
shall be legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury sustained by any
person, and injury to or destruction of property arising out of the ownership or use of the owned automobile. The Insurer will defend any lawsuit, however groundless, false or fraudulent, against any insured for such
damages as are payable under this policy but the Insurer may make such
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems appropriate.

37. Richmond, supra note 34, at 272.
38. Id. at 273.
39. See, e.g., Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 74 A.2d 1117,1119-21 (Conn.
1999); Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 656 A-2d 779, 784-85 (Md. 1995); Nw.
Pump & Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P2d 1241, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
40. Aydin Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 4th 1183,1202 (Cal. 1998) (citing Weil v. Fed.
Kemper Life Assurance Co., 7 Cal. 4th 125, 148 (Cal. 1994); Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.,
38 Cal. 3d 425, 438 (Cal. 1985)).
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(b) No action shall lie against the Insurer until after full compliance with the
terms of the policy and until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay
shall have been finally determined by judgment against the insured or
written agreement of settlement among the insured, the claimant and the
Insurer.
(c) The insured shall cooperate with the Insurer by disclosing all pertinent
facts known to him or her, and upon Insurer's request shall attend hearings and trials, shall assist in obtaining evidence and the attendance of witnesses and shall participate in effecting settlements and conducting suits.

Other policy terms will clearly be involved in determining when the
insurer's promise to pay and the insurer's promise to defend are to be performed. These might include, for example, the terms of the policy concerning the extent and the amount of coverage, the meaning of insured
under the policy, and clauses (or state statutes) prohibiting coverage of
41
willful injuries inflicted by an insured. The terms outlined above are
complicated enough:
" Who has real control over a lawsuit against the insured?
" Can the insurer refuse to defend the lawsuit if the insurer believes that the
policy does not cover the underlying liability?
" Does the insurer breach its duties when it refuses to make a settlement on
behalf of the insured within the policy limits and the settlement offer was
a reasonable one?
" When, if at all, do third parties have the right to sue the insurer directly?
" What is the responsibility of the insurer when it has breached either its
duty to pay or its duty to defend?
" Is the insurer's duty to defend conditional on the insured complying with
his duty to cooperate?
" In any case of breach of duty, what is the measure of damages?
In determining coverage, the starting point is the insuring clause-that
portion of the policy under which an insurer promises to "pay on behalf of
the insured all sums that the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
42
as damages because of... property damage ...caused by an occurrence.
The burden is on the insured to prove that a claim is covered under the
policy. 43 In contrast, it is the insurer's duty to prove that a claim is within a
policy exclusion. This is not always an easy task inasmuch as policy exclu44
sions are read narrowly and against the insurer.

41. See generally, LEO P. MARTINEZ, MARC S. MAYERSON & DOUG R. RICHMOND, NEW
APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAw AND PRAc-rCE GUIDE § 16.05 (LexisNexis 2007) (conflicts can be

attributable to exclusions).
42. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
43. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
44. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 101-02 (Cal. 1973); Whitaker, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435.
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With this background, a lawyer advising a client must first determine
whether a claim falls within the terms of a policy. For example, courts
have grappled with the threshold question of whether costs required to be
expended by an administrative agency constitute damages. Many courts
have found that such sums are not within the reach of the insurer's duty
to indemnify.4 The point is that even seemingly innocuous provisions in
an insurance policy are potentially laden with ambiguity. Determining the
scope of coverage is not always a straightforward task.
To further complicate matters, the duty to indemnify and the duty to
defend are independent and are governed by different standards. 46 Accordingly, each is given separate treatment. Liability insurers may, and commonly do, seek to avoid paying the more esoteric varieties of personal
injury and to limit coverage to "bodily" or "physical" injuries. For example, a standard homeowner's insurance policy covers bodily injury, which it
cautiously defines as "bodily harm, sickness or disease." This language may
be given literal effect to eliminate noneconomic damages, such as emotional suffering, from coverage. 47 At the other end of the spectrum, a court
employing a liberal and expansive use of the canons of insurance policy
interpretation may stretch bodily injury to embrace loss of consortium dam48
ages sustained by the spouse of a person injured in an auto accident.
The more-often-litigated undertaking by the insurer is its duty to defend. As discussed above, this duty is broadly defined. Moreover, an insurer
must act promptly in providing a defense. Insurer delay in declining a defense that results in prejudice to the insured may very well preclude the
insurer from later declining coverage. 49 Moreover, an insurer's failure to
meet its duty to defend may constitute breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and expose the insurer to punitive damages. 0
The problem faced by counsel in determining coverage is rooted in
the obligation of the insurer to provide indemnity and defense of covered
claims. Although the duty to indemnify poses no immediate difficulty from

45. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th
945, 951 (Cal. 2001).
46. EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 898 E Supp. 952, 955 (D. Conn. 1995); Nw. Pump &
Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
47. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. No. 1,612 F Supp.
285, 287 (D. Wyo. 1985).
48. Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
49. See, e.g., Bluestein & Sander v. Chi. Ins. Co., 276 E 3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2002); Greenberg & Covitz v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 909, 915-16 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
50. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Ellen Smith
Pryor, The Ton Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 Mn. L. REv. 1, 20 (1999); Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer's Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221, 230-31 (1997).
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a conflict standpoint, it is nonetheless related to the duty to defend. The
duty to defend does not extend to claims that are not covered."' Thus, if
an insurer can demonstrate a lack of coverage, the insurer will be able to
escape, within bounds, the duty to defend. Of course, the demonstration
of the lack of coverage coupled with the need to defend in the face of
undeveloped facts causes the problem. An insurer-appointed independent
defense counsel might, in the course of her investigation or in the course of
litigation, discover facts that either establish coverage or demonstrate that
the claim is not covered.
In arriving at this point, it is important to note that the insurance contract does not alter the primary attorney-client relationship. However, it
does introduce potentially conflicting objectives between the insurer and the
insured. A defense attorney may lose the ability to objectively manage settlement and litigation when a long-term relationship with an insurer is contrasted with a transitory claim file. There may be divergent interests when
a claim rests on alternative theories or when a claim is partially covered. Finally, the effect on settlement and litigation strategy when defense expenses
52
are included within the policy limits may also cause potential difficulties.
Doug Richmond has compiled a neat summary of the conflicts that
can arise in the tripartite relationship. He describes these costly and timeconsuming conflicts, which he terms distractions,in a list that includes
" a lack of candor between insured and defense counsel where the insured
believes there might be adverse consequences in being candid,
" a heightened awareness of the potential for conflicts,
• a need to disclose conflicts,
* obtainment of consent to proceed in the face of conflicts,
" identification of conflicts that cannot be waived,
• costs of the insured's coverage counsel in addition to independent counsel,
" control of the defense,
" confidentiality of information,
" malpractice liability concerns," and
4
* the insured's concern for its reputation.1
Some of these conflicts come about because the responsibilities of counsel are implicit and not described in the insurance policy. 5 They also arise

51. Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35, 47 (Cal. 1997).
52. Dan D. Kohane & Audrey A. Seeley, Managing the Relationship Between the Coverage
Case and UnderlyingLitigation, NEw APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE § 16.10
(LexisNexis 2007) (conflict can arise where the potential recovery exceeds the policy limits).
53. Richmond, supra note 34, at 271. Professors Pryor & Silver have a similar list. Pryor
& Silver, supra note 34, at 39.
54. Baker, supra note 4, at 129-31. Tom Baker adds this to the list of possible conflicts.
55. Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 36.
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because of the nature of the coverage contest, i.e., the assertion by an insurer "that its policy does not cover a claim asserted against an insured or
reserves its right to make this assertion at a future point in time. 5' 6
The American Bar Association's response to the potential conflicts posed
by the tripartite relationship is reflected in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct." Rule 1.8(f) precludes a lawyer from receiving compensation for
representing a client unless "(1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there
is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by rule 1.6 [relating to client

confidential information]."" Although the model rule states an admirable
goal, it provides little useful guidance as to exactly what set of circumstances might constitute a conflict, i.e., "the interference with the lawyer's
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."'5 9 Thus, it is
not surprising that courts and counsel alike have been unable to formulate
a satisfactory bright-line test for determining when a conflict exists.
One obstacle to formulating a useful approach is that professional responsibility principles may be inadequate to the task of policing conduct
in insurance cases.60 Unfortunately, substantive insurance law also may not
61
be up to the task.
IV. IMPRECISION OF CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST

All of this brings us to the central question: How is it determined whether
an insured is entitled to coverage under a policy? This is the threshold
inquiry that puts into motion the tripartite relationship, that informs an
insurer's decision to consider a reservation of rights, and that is a key to
the invocation of the insurer's duty to provide independent counsel under
California Civil Code § 2860. As noted above, § 2860 makes clear that not

every reservation of rights will entitle a policyholder or insured the right
to independent Cumis counsel. This pronouncement does not make the

task of determining the existence of a conflict any easier. In James 3 Corp. v.
Truck Insurance Exchange,62 for example, an insurance company retained
separate counsel to advise it as to whether there existed a conflict under

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 38.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ANNOTATED

Id. R. 1.8(f).

Id.
Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 35.
Id.
91 Cal. App. 4th 1093 (2001).

(6th ed. 2007).
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Civil Code § 2860.63 The court held that an insured is not entitled to
independent counsel "where the coverage issue is independent of, or ex4
trinsic to, the issues in the underlying action [citation omitted]." It goes
without saying that a determination of whether the coverage issue was independent of, or extrinsic to, the issues in the underlying action required
6
the consultation and advice of an expert by the insurer. This only begs
the question of what a policyholder or insured can do when faced with the
same questions.
The courts that have dealt with Cumis situations have not treated the
issue in a focused way. In California, the suggestion is that a lawyer's cov-66
erage advice is distinctly separate from a lawyer's defense of an insured.
According to the California formulation,
[s]ince it is almost unavoidable that, in the course of investigating and preparing the insured's defense to the third party's action, the insured's attorney will
come across information relevant to a coverage or similar issue, it is quite difficult for an attorney beholden to the insurer to represent the insured where
its rights regarding coverage (unless, of course, the
the insurer is reserving
67
insured consents).
As a practical matter, this separation of defense duties and coverage advice makes sense. Commentators have noted that an insurer is neither in68
clined nor able to provide coverage advice to its policyholder and have
concluded that because an insurance policy does not contain any explicit
or implicit obligation to provide coverage advice, the insurer's primary obligation is to provide what the insurance policy explicitly requires, i.e., a
defense.69 That being the case, the duties of appointed counsel may be
construed narrowly: appointed counsel have a specialized role limited to
providing a defense.70 Indeed, appointed counsel may very well not be
63. Id. at 1099.
64. Id. at 1101.
65. See Kohane & Seeley, supra note 52, §§ 16.10[1], 16.11 (a reservation of rights letter
can preserve an insurer's coverage defenses, and a nonwaiver agreement can resolve initial
conflicts).
66. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co., 692 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Assurance Co. of Am. v.Haven, 32 Cal. App. 4th 78, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
67. Haven, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 87 (citing San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v.Cumis Ins.
Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 364-67; Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602,
613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
68. Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 57.
69. Id.; Marc S. Mayerson, Fetteringthe Insurer's Privilege to Control the Defense It Is Duty
Bound to Provide, 5:4 INS. COVERAGE L. BULL. 1 (May 2006) (insurance policies rarely address
this problem); see also Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the ProfessionalObligationsof Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1, 11 (2001) (noting that policies do not define
the extent of the defense obligation).
70. Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 93.
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competent to render coverage advice. 7 This presents a persuasive case that
independent counsel's task may be difficult in cases where coverage-related
responsibilities are excluded from their duties. 72 This does not even take
into account the crass observation by one court that "appointed counsel
may tend to favor the interests of the insurer primarily because of the prospect of future employment."73 All of this leaves aside the issue of the mechanism by which a policyholder or insured receives the coverage advice.
Policyholders more often than not simply tender claims to their insurers
74
without any thought about independent counsel.
The hint in the cases that address the tripartite relationship is that appointment of independent counsel was intended to cure the problem,
even if coverage is a separate and distinct duty of counsel. 5 Commentators discussing the Fourth Circuit's Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Ben
Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. 76 expand on this point.77 The Fourth Circuit's
expectation is that professional responsibility rules combined with the potential for a malpractice action will adequately protect an insured's interests.7" However, as outlined above, the problem faced by insureds is more
subtle.
Two problems faced by independent counsel illustrate the problem, as
observed by the Alaska Supreme Court in CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.79 These problems are not novel 0 and include (1) an
insurer's reservation of rights and (2) an insurer-appointed independent
counsel's discovery of information that might lead to a coverage defense.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 56-57.
73. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Alaska
1993).
74. Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 55.
75. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co., 692 E Supp. 1150, 1158
(N.D. Cal. 1988); CHI ofAlaska, 844 P.2d at 1118.
76. 433 E3d 365 (4th Cir. 2005).
77. Mayerson, supra note 69.
78. Ben Arnold, 433 F.3d at 373; Mayerson, supra note 69.
79. 844 P.2d at 1116. The CHI case actually mentions three situations. First, the court suggests that a reservation of rights might prompt only a token defense where the insurer thinks
it will succeed in asserting noncoverage. Second, it suggests that the defense will be motivated
to shade the facts toward a showing of noncoverage. Third, it suggests that the insurer might
discover confidential information in the course of conducting an investigation. Id. I conflate
the first two scenarios in arriving at my analysis.
80. See Mayerson, supra note 69; Richmond, supra note 34, at 272-84. Richmond discusses
seven different situations that give rise to conflicts. These include where an insurer reserves
its rights, where claimed damages exceed coverage, where defense costs reduce available coverage, where multiple parties are represented, where counsel's defense activities generate information suggesting a possible coverage defense, where punitive damages are claimed, and
where the insurer attempts to limit discovery to reduce expenses. Id.
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A. Insurer'sReservation of Rights
A reservation of rights is essentially an insurer's unilateral decision under
which it "agrees to defend the policyholder but reserves its right to assert
coverage defenses." 8 Certainly, a reservation of rights is not benign from
an insured's perspective. Many jurisdictions recognize this and, as a conse82
quence, have adopted a per se rule regarding reservations of rights. In these
jurisdictions, an insurer's reservation of rights is a per se conflict of interest
that allows an insured to reject the reservation. In jurisdictions adopting the
per se approach, by rejecting the reservation an insured forces the insurer
either to defend unconditionally or to surrender control of the defense to
an insured-chosen independent counsel.83 Although this approach is not
a perfect solution, it does have the advantage of seeing that the insured's
interests are protected.8 4 Either the insured is provided an unconditional
defense, or the insured is allowed to choose his or her own lawyer.
In such cases, competence on coverage matters might still be an issue.
Within law practices, it is not uncommon for defense lawyers to defer to
colleagues on coverage matters. Defense expertise and coverage expertise
are each sufficiently broad and arcane so as to preclude the ordinary lawyer
from mastering both areas of the law. Although the insured still faces the
problem of lawyer competence in coverage matters, at least it is a matter
within the insured's control, and the risk of expertise is correctly placed on
the insured.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the notion that the reservation of rights
is a per se conflict of interest.8 5 California Civil Code § 2860 adopts this
approach. It specifies that a conflict may arise in the case of a reservation
of rights. 6
The problems that arise in a reservation of rights in this scenario are
several and each is dependent on the context in which it occurs. First, an
insured is not free to reject the insurer-appointed defense counsel. In the
case of rejection, it is the insured who then must pay for independent counsel. 7 Surely this is an unpalatable alternative to an insured who expected to
be represented at the insurer's expense. Second, an insured who accepts the
insurer-appointed defense counsel may be represented by a lawyer whose

81. MARTINEZ, MAYERSON & RICHMOND, supra note 41, § 11.11 [2][a].
82. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co., 433 F3d 365, 370-71
(4th Cir. 2005) (listing jurisdictions that adopt the per se approach).
83. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Alaska 1993).
84. Id. (the loyalties of insurer-appointed independent counsel are very much in doubt).
85. Ben Arnold, 433 E3d at 372. The Ben Arnold case provides a list of other jurisdictions
that reject the per se approach. Id. at 371.
86. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(b) (2008).
87. Mayerson, supra note 69.
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engagement may be limited by the insurer to providing a defense, presumably to the exclusion of providing coverage advice.8 8 There is nothing
sinister in this limitation: the insurance policy only requires the insurer to
provide a defense and does not require the insurer to provide a lawyer for
the purpose of providing coverage advice. Third, as noted above, the defense lawyer may not be competent to provide coverage advice. Lastly, an
insured is denied the peace of mind and security that a truly independent
counsel might provide. 9
B. Problem of ConfidentialInformation

The second problem that comes with the use of insurer-appointed independent counsel is the possibility of discovering confidential information
that would defeat coverage. In this respect, the first question that requires
an answer is a seemingly innocent inquiry: Who exactly does the insurerappointed independent counsel represent-the insured, the insurer, or
both? Unfortunately, the ultimate solution depends on geography because
the answer varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 90
The more defensible position, in my opinion, is that the insured is the
client of the insurer-appointed defense counsel. 9 If this is the case, there
is little theoretical difficulty with the possibility of divided loyalties. Of
course, this sets aside the very real problem of the lawyer who is motivated
by repeat business from the insurer.92
The more difficult question arises in jurisdictions in which the insurerappointed independent counsel's client is either the insurer or the combined
insurer/insured. In such cases, the crucial question is what the appropriate
result is if the independent counsel comes across confidential information
that may defeat coverage. If the insurer-appointed independent counsel's
client is the insurer, practically speaking, both the insured and insurer are
ill-served by that counsel's defense. The insured is likely to be less candid
if he appreciates the import of the counsel's representation. If the insured
does not appreciate the effect of the counsel's representation, it is fun-

88. Pryor & Silver, supra note 34, at 56.
89. Mayerson, supra note 69.
90. Professor Charles Silver has an excellent article that discusses this problem. Charles
Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured? 72 TEX. L. REv.
1583 (May 1994).
91. See, e.g., In re Rules of Professional Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814 (Mont. 2000); Barefield v. DPIC Cos., 600 S.E.2d 256, 269-70 (W. Va.

2004).
92. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Alaska
1993); Aviva Abramovsky, The EnterpriseModel of ManagingConflicts of Interestin the Tripartite
Insurance Defense Relationship, 27 CARuozo L. REv. 193, 195 (Oct. 2005) (discussing the pecuniary motivation of insurer-appointed counsel).
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damentally unfair to allow such counsel to potentially gain access to any
information that might defeat coverage.
Additionally, the problem outlined above is not mitigated by the idea
that insurer-appointed independent counsel represents two clients, the
insurer and the insured. This idea, better known as the dual-client doctrine, provides that "[s]o long as the interests of the insurer and the insured
coincide, they are both the clients of the defense attorney and the defense
9
attorney's fiduciary duty runs to both the insurer and the insured." The
where
unstated assumption is that dual representation is inappropriate
94
the interests of the insurer and the insured do not coincide.
Although it is easy to state that dual representation is not appropriate if
the interests of the insurer and the insured do not coincide, it is not always
apparent that this is the case. Discovery may disclose the presence of a coverage defense, or an insured might, advertently or inadvertently, disclose
to his independent counsel information that might defeat coverage. Does
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the insured preclude disclosure to the insurer, or does the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the insurer require disclosure
to the insured? In the latter case, even if the lawyer at that point advises
the insured on the need to retain truly independent counsel, the existence
of a coverage defense is now known by the insurer if the independent
counsel shares the information with it. I agree with the suggestion that
resorting to rules of professional responsibility or requiring an insured to
9
pursue a malpractice action falls far short of an adequate solution.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of independent counsel is fraught with peril for the insured. Whether
faced with a reservation of rights or the possibility of disclosing information
that might defeat coverage, Cumis and its progeny leave an insured practically unprotected and in need of essential coverage advice. The insidious
aspect of this oversight is that it is seldom given much thought either by the
parties involved or by the courts that are called on, often too late, to fix the
harm. Coverage advice really is the missing piece of the Cumis puzzle.

93. Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1537, 1542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof'l Law Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1718, 1727 (Cal Ct.
App. 1991)). The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (6th ed. 2007) contains
a list of citations in various jurisdictions that follow the dual-client doctrine.
94. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W2d 552, 560 (Tex. 1973) (actions of"independent" counsel who actively worked with the insurer to develop information that defeated
coverage held against public policy).
95. Mayerson, supra note 69.

